Posts Tagged encryption

More BBC iPlayer Encryption FOI Materials

I received some further materials from the BBC about the iPlayer encryption issues. My request is covered in the BBCs’ Final Response. They released 2 documents, one I specifically asked for entitled “Pan-BBC Approach to Combating Piracy“, another entitled “Public/Press reaction to introduction of SWF Verification on iPlayer – Briefing Paper”.

They again denied my request for details on the mystery rights holders, however I have since noticed Alan Cox made a similarish request relating to the FreeView HD encryption and his response lists the following organisations as having indicated interest to the BBC in the Freeview HD encryption proposal:

  • ITV
  • C4
  • S4C
  • Five
  • BBC Worldwide
  • Disney
  • Fox Entertainment
  • Sony Pictures
  • Time Warner

I’ve sent the following reply to the BBC:

Hi,

Thank you very much for this. I am glad to hear the BBC intends
to publish a blog entry relating to these issues soon. It is very
much a goal of mine in all this to seek to provoke useful, productive
dialogue.

I am very disappointed that you have chosen to deny my request
for information on which organisations are making encryption
requirements on the BBC. I note that have you supplied such
information to an extremely similar request that covered the HD DVB
encryption, at:

http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/encryption_proposals_to_ofcom

I do not quite understand how the DVB-T2 EPG encryption issue is
different from the iPlayer encryption/DRM issue. I would ask you
review your decision in light of the above to ensure your decisions
are consistent.

I am also disappointed you were unable to supply further documents.
E.g. you must surely have recent documents covering the SSL/TLS
authentication encryption scheme for iPlayer, brought to public
attention recently with the launching of the iPad iPlayer. Such
documents seem to fairly clearly fall within the scope of my recent
requests, and yet somehow none of the documents I have received have
mentioned this scheme. I would ask you review your response to ensure
you have not accidently missed out such documents – it seems you must
have.

I thank you again for your time in all this. I apologise again for
the burden, but I stress again that I feel there is a strong public interest in this.

regards,

Paul Jakma

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Good Password Hygiene

In a hypothetically perfect world, we’d be able to remember infinite numbers of passwords. However, for most people that’s not possible. Instead we have to find a way to make best use of that limited memory. Here’s how:

  • Do not use passwords that are easy to guess, e.g anything directly related to you, like your name or names of family/friends/pets/etc; or date of birth; or favourite colour,band,etc..
  • Ideally, use a longish random string as your password, of at least 10 characters (but longer is better).
  • The same applies for password-recovery questions, which often ask for information that is in the public domain (e.g. mother’s maiden name, date of birth). Do not provide real answers! Instead just make something up, or use another random string if possible.
  • Do not re-use passwords across different websites, unless you truly do not care about what is on those sites, and what they can do in your name with that password.
  • Do not be afraid to write them down if you can store them securely. E.g. if your home is reasonably secure, it’s fine to store most passwords on paper there. This goes against advice from many well-meaning, but utterly-wrong “experts”.
  • If you trust that a computer or device is sufficiently secure, it’s perfectly fine to store passwords on it, e.g. in a text-file. Also, many programmes support saving passwords and if you trust those programmes then it’s perfectly OK to use those features.
  • Consider using disk-encryption products like PGPDisk, TrueCrypt, BitLocker or the built-in capabilities of many Linux/Unix distributions (some of which offer this at install time) to protect your data with a master key. This is particularly recommended for laptops.
  • Any computer running Microsoft Windows likely can not be considered secure and should not trusted with more sensitive information. Portable devices should not be considered secure, unless their contents are known to be encrypted, and they automatically lock themselves after a small period of unuse (i.e. don’t trust your phone too much for storing sensitive data).

Basically, in an ideal world, all your day-to-day passwords for your various, online accounts should be unguessable, random strings;  you’d never have to remember any of them; you would just, at certain times, have to enter a master pass-phrase (which should be unguessable, but still memorable and much longer than a password) without which the passwords would effectively not be accessible.

Remember, security is a compromise between convenience and consequence. The ideal level of compromise will differ between different people, and between different situations. E.g., obviously, it’s probably a good idea to tolerate a good bit of inconvenience with your online banking login details and commit these solely to memory. If you have too many accounts to memorise the details, then store them very securely, e.g. buy a strong box or small safe, and obscure which details belong to what accounts – hopefully this buys enough time to contact banks and have the details changed if your house is burgled and the box stolen.

Common sense goes a long way. Unfortunately the “experts” you sometimes hear from don’t always have it.

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